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Abstract
By examining disaggregate state-level data, we address two weaknesses of prior estimates of
economic voting models in U.S. Presidential elections. First, our disaggregate approach
substantially improves statistical power, thus reducing the danger of “over- fitting.” Second,
our analysis demonstrates systematic differences in voting behavior across states, which have
been ignored: voters in higher-income states respond significantly to inflation, changes in the
Dow-Jones stock market average, the number of terms the incumbent party has held office,
and measures of national security concerns, yet voters in lower-income states respond
significantly only to economic growth. Our forecasts for the 2008 U.S. Presidential election
predict a statistical dead-heat overall, but a systematic preference for Senator John McCain in
lower-income states and for Senator Barack Obama in higher-income states.
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Well before the 1982 William Clinton campaign phrase "it's the economy, stupid," 
Kramer 1971, Stigler 1973, and Fair 1978 proposed that voting in Presidential elections is 
largely determined by economic factors. These models emphasize economic growth, price 
stability, and the role of parties, and despite very limited degrees of freedom, have significant 
predictive power for the popular vote for the President.  For some elections, however, the 
predictions of these models go awry, including two recent elections. 
 
In the election of 1992, the models falsely predicted a landslide victory for the 
incumbent, President George H.W. Bush. Instead, he lost in a close election to Governor 
William Clinton. In response to this errant forecast, subsequent studies (e.g., Gleisner 1992, 
Haynes and Stone 1994, and Fair 1996) introduced additional determinants, e.g., the number 
of consecutive terms the incumbent party held the Presidency, the rate of change in the Dow-
Jones stock market average, and changes in the proportion of the population in the military (a 
proxy for national security concerns). These determinants improved estimates and forecasts of 
voting models, yet each newly proposed variable raised the danger of “overfitting" given the 
small number of elections. 
 
The 2004 election again appeared to pose a puzzle. As in 1992, the models (e.g., Fair 
2004) predicted a landslide victory in the popular vote for the incumbent President, ironically 
President George W. Bush, the son of the former President George H.W. Bush, yet the pre-
election polls were close and the incumbent President Bush won by a small margin. One 
obvious omitted factor was the ongoing conflict in Iraq. To address this omission, in Haynes 
and Stone 2004 we introduced two factors, working in opposition, to account more fully for 
the potential role of armed conflicts and national security: the first, a “rally round the flag” 
proxy, which would increase support for an incumbent President, and the second, a proxy for 
the economic cost of national defense, which can draw support away from an incumbent. We 
showed that this second factor outweighed the first one in the 2004 election, reducing 
President Bush's predicted vote share and thereby narrowing the divergence between the 
model's prediction and both the pre-election polls and the final vote. 
 
  A major limitation with all previous tests of models of Presidential elections is the 
reliance on aggregate voting data, with very few Presidential elections (most estimates are 
based upon only 20 to 25 observations). Nevertheless, researchers have attempted to address 
perceived model limitations by introducing additional determinants of voting, e.g., for the 
1992 and 2004 elections, which further increases the danger of "overfitting."  In this note, we 
reexamine traditional economic voting models of U.S. Presidential elections by exploring 
disaggregate state-level data for the U.S. from 1916 through 2008.  Our results reaffirm the 
general findings in previous aggregate estimates, but also reveal novel monotonic patterns in 
the disaggregate estimates, including that voters in high income states respond to inflation but 
voters in low income states respond to real growth.  We also show that these income-
contingent voting patterns have dramatic implications for forecasts of the upcoming 2008 
Presidential election between Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain. 
 
  12. Model 
 
The point of departure for our disaggregate analysis is the general frameworks of Fair 
(1978, 1988) and Gleisner 1992, where voter utility (U) is determined by economic 
performance (E) and non-economic factors (N). 
 
                                                                  U = U[E, N]           (1) 
 
The voter then chooses between the Democratic candidate D or Republican candidate R based 
on expected outcomes of E and N for each party. Thus, the probability that a Democrat is 
chosen over a Republican depends on the difference between the corresponding expected 
utilities for the two parties (for a general derivation, see Judge et. al. 1985, p. 769): 
 
                                                         VOTE = prob [U(R) < U(D)]                   (2) 
 
We interpret VOTE as the Democratic share of the two-party vote at the aggregate level.  
VOTE is a continuous variable, but is bounded between zero and one.  However, the log-odds 
transformation of VOTE is unbounded, permitting estimation using ordinary least squares 
(OLS): 
 
                                                           V = log [VOTE/(1-VOTE)]                                          (3)       
        
In our state-level panel sample, both observed and predicted values of VOTE in the 
linear specification are concentrated around 0.5, with none outside the bound, supporting OLS 
estimation of the linear model.  For simplicity of interpretation, we therefore present results in 
linear rather than log-odds form; estimates for the two specifications are in fact very similar. 
 
3. Estimation Equations and Data 
 
Our base equation follows Haynes and Stone 2004, modified for estimation with  
disaggregate state-level data. The model combines the primary components of Fair (1978, 
1996, 2002), as extended by Gleisner 1992 to include a stock market variable and Haynes and 
Stone 2004 to add variables on the number of consecutive terms the incumbent party has been 
in power and on national security.  Eq. (4) is the resulting estimation equation, where 
expected signs are listed above the regressors. 
 
                               +                   -                       +                        +                        -                                 
       VOTE = f [PARTY, DURATION*P, DOWJONES*P, GROWTH*P, INFLATION*P,  
                                                    +                     - 
                                            ARMY*P, ARMYSPEND*P]                                                     (4)
  
where VOTE is the Democratic share of the two-party Presidential vote; 
PARTY (P) is 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat, and -1 if a Republican (all regressors are  
interacted with P to permit symmetric treatment of the two parties);   
DURATION is the number of consecutive terms the incumbent party has been in power; 
  2DOWJONES is the annual rate of change in the Dow-Jones stock market index, January to 
  October of the election year; 
GROWTH is the annual growth rate of real per capita GNP (GDP) in 2nd and 3rd quarters of 
the election year; 
INFLATION is the absolute value of the annualized inflation rate (GNP/GDP deflator) in the  
two-year period prior to the election; 
ARMY is the annualized percentage change of the proportion of the population in the armed  
forces in the two-year period prior to the election; and 
ARMYSPEND is the annualized percentage change in the proportion of government spending  
devoted to national security in the two-year period prior to the election. 
 
  Our sample begins with the 1916 U.S. Presidential election, consistent with Fair 1996.  
Data on the regressors, which are aggregate U.S. series, are from Haynes and Stone 2004, 
updated as detailed in the Data Appendix. Aggregate data on the dependent variable VOTE 
are also from Haynes and Stone 2004, and disaggregate state-level data on VOTE are 




  The dependent variable VOTE is the Democratic share of the two-party Presidential 
vote.  Each regressor is interacted with Party (P) so that interpretation of the impact of a 
change in a regressor on the dependent variable is symmetric whether the incumbent party is 
Democratic or Republican. The first column in Table 1, using aggregate data, presents OLS 
estimates of eq. (4), with t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected (White) standard 
errors in parentheses. The remaining columns in Table 1, using state-level panel data, present 
GLS estimates of eq. (4) based on cross-section weights, include state fixed effects, and report 
t-statistics based on White cross-section standard errors in parentheses.
1  Reestimation with 
state-level panel data using OLS and/or excluding state fixed effects (omitted for brevity) 
yields qualitatively similar estimates, and computing t-statistics without the White cross-
section correction yields higher, although biased, t-statistics (see Moulton 1990). 
 
  The first column in Table 1, entitled Aggregate, displays significant coefficients with 
the correct sign on all regressors, and closely replicates the aggregate estimates in Haynes and 
Stone 2004, but is based on only 23 observations.
2  The second column, entitled Panel, 
repeats the estimates for the same specification as in column one, but is based on the state-
level panel data with 1126 observations.  The Panel estimates in column two are generally 
very similar to those in column one, with the exception of the loss of significance for the 
                                                 
1GLS cross-section weights are used because of the large differences in the sizes of the 50 
U.S. states; fixed-effects permits intercept differences across the states; and White cross-
section standard errors are necessary to prevent downward bias in the standard errors resulting 
from the use of identical regressors across states (see Moulton 1990 for a theoretical 
discussion of this problem).   
2 The two estimates are not exact because the samples differ: the estimate in Haynes and 
Stone 2004 is from 1908 through 2000, while the column one estimate is from 1916 through 
2004. 
  3coefficient on Army. The close similarity of the estimates in these two columns suggests that 
the findings and conclusions in the many aggregate voting estimates presented in the literature 
the past fifteen years are reliable despite the fact they are based on only 20 or so observations 
of data.  
 
  The final five columns in Table 1, labeled Y1 through Y5, summarize estimates of eq. 
(4) based on quartile subsets of the state-level panel data after ordering the states by their per 
capita personal income at the mid-sample year of 1960.  Thus, the Y1 column is eq. (4) 
estimated for the ten lowest income states, Y2 for the next ten higher income states, up to Y5 
for the highest ten income states.
3 Comparison of the coefficients on each regressor across 
income quartiles shows a consistently monotonic income-contingent voting pattern. The 
coefficient on duration smoothly declines from insignificant to significantly negative as 
income increases (i.e., shifting from the estimate in column Y1 to that in column Y5), 
indicating that only voters in the higher-income states are more adversely influenced by the 
number of terms the incumbent party has been in power. The coefficient on DowJones 
smoothly increases from insignificant to significantly positive as income increases, and the 
coefficient on Inflation smoothly declines from insignificant to significantly negative as 
income increases, patterns suggesting that higher-income citizens, unlike lower-income 
citizens, vote based on economic outcomes that impact the value of their asset holdings.  
Alternatively, the coefficient on Growth declines from significantly positive to insignificant 
as income increases, indicating that lower-income citizens, unlike higher-income citizens, 
vote based on economic outcomes that impact their employment status. Finally, both military 
variables become significant as income increases (positive for Army, and negative for 
ArmySpend), supporting the importance of both dimensions of national defense determinants 
only for higher-income voters. These novel monotonic patterns in the regression coefficients 
across income quartiles, with all coefficients correctly signed when significant, remain robust 
to alternative estimation methods.   
 
5.  Forecasts of the 2008 Election 
 
  Out-of-sample forecasts for the upcoming 2008 election are reported in the next-to-last 
row in Table 1, where the most updated values for the regressors are used in the forecast (see 
the Data Appendix for these values).  The Aggregate and Panel election forecasts of the 
overall Democratic vote share are extremely close to 50.0 percent, a predicted dead-heat. 
Given the similarity in the regression coefficients in the aggregate and the state-level panel 
equations, the similarity in these forecasts is not surprising.   
 
                                                 
3 Y1 states are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia; Y2 states are Idaho, Louisiana, 
Maine, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Vermont; Y3 
states are Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, and Texas; Y4 states are Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming; and Y5 states are 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, 
Nevada, and New York.  
  4The pattern in the election forecasts across income quartiles differs consistently from 
the bottom to the top quartiles. The Democratic vote shares (in percent), predicted for the five 
income quartiles beginning with Y1, are 44.60, 44.66, 50.40, 51.09, and 53.35, hence increase 
monotonically as income increases.
4  The bottom row summarizes the fraction of the total 
popular vote attributed to each income group based on voting data from the 2004 Presidential 
election. The highest fraction of votes comes from the highest income quartile, Y5, which is 
not surprising since two states in Y5 are the high population states of California and New 
York.   
 
  In sum, the out-of-sample forecasts predict a statistical dead-heat in the U.S. popular 
vote for the 2008 Presidential election, but a systematic monotonic preference for Senator 
John McCain in lower-income states and for Senator Barack Obama in higher-income states.
5  
 
6.  Concluding Comments 
 
This note examines the reliability of aggregate estimates of U.S. voting in Presidential 
elections, typically based on only 20 or so observations, by re-estimation with state-level 
panel data, and reports forecasts of the 2008 U.S. Presidential election with these data.  We 
present three conclusions.  First, aggregate estimates using data from 1916 to 2004, with only 
23 observations, are very similar to state-level panel estimates for the same years based on 
1126 observations, suggesting surprising reliability of the findings in the aggregate 
Presidential voting literature despite limited degrees of freedom.  
 
Second, after partitioning the U.S. states into quartiles based on income level, we find 
a novel and monotonically consistent income-contingent pattern across the coefficients on 
each regressor. For the higher income states, increases in the number of consecutive terms a 
party has been in office reduces their probability of reelection. Also, for higher-income states, 
increases in the change in the Dow-Jones stock market index improves the incumbent’s 
probability of reelection, and increases in inflation reduces this probability. Conversely, only 
for lower-income states, increases in real growth improves the incumbent’s probability of 
reelection. Finally, national defense factors, both the positive dimension (“rally-round-the-
flag” motive) and the negative dimension (the costs of sustaining a war), are significant for 
higher-income states but not lower-income states. 
 
                                                 
4 The 2008 values of the regressors used in the forecasts were taken from data through 
September 17, 2008.  If these regressor values were computed two weeks later, deeper into 
the U.S. financial crisis, the forecast percents would have been higher than 51.09 for Y4 and 
53.35 for Y5 because of the dramatic drop over those two weeks in the Dow-Jones stock 
market index. 
5 Every election includes idiosyncratic determinants unique to that election.  For the 2008 
election, these would in part include the race and gender of the candidates, Black turnout, new 
voter registration, and the financial crisis of fall 2008 (beyond its direct impact on the 
economic regressors in the model). Of course, no model, no matter how elaborate, can fully 
capture in advance all factors that influence voters the day of the election. 
  5These income-contingent patterns in the regression coefficients represent an important 
yet neglected dimension of voting behavior for the U.S. President. The pattern of significance 
of the inflation and the Dow-Jones variables only for higher-income states, where presumably 
wealth preservation is a stronger motive than employment stability, in combination with 
significance of real growth only for lower-income states, where employment stability is likely 
a stronger motive than wealth preservation, is consistent with evidence in Joyadev (2006, 
p.71), who in a different context concludes that “the poor are more likely than the rich to 
prefer that unemployment be controlled rather than inflation (they are less relatively inflation 
averse)”. 
 
Our third general finding concerns forecasts for the 2008 U.S. Presidential election.  
Both aggregate and state-level panel data predict a statistical dead-heat.  However, 
disaggregation shows that forecasts systematically differ by state income level. The lowest-
income quartile of states clearly prefers Senator John McCain by a significant margin (55.4% 
to 44.6%); yet the middle-income quartile of states is almost evenly split between the two 
candidates; and finally the highest-income quartile of states prefers Senator Barack Obama by 
a substantial and significant margin (53.35% to 46.65%). This evidence suggests that  
predictions of 2008 voting in key “swing” states should include income-contingent 
differences in state-level voting preferences, especially in the context of the fall 2008 U.S. 
financial crisis. 
 
In sum, this research presents a potentially rich avenue to understand voting behavior 
in U.S. Presidential elections which has heretofore been ignored, and many questions remain.  
On the empirical side, our findings should be explored using other groupings of states and 
samples, other estimation methods such as interaction of the regressors with state income, and 
inclusion of control factors such as education level and race to understand the role of income 
in our evidence.  On the theoretical side, the dramatic and monotonic income-contingent 
patterns in the voting coefficients should be investigated and related to other determinants of 
voting in U.S. Presidential elections. 
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  8Table 1 
Democratic Share of US Presidential Two-Party Vote -- Eq. (4) -- 1916-2004 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable               Aggregate     Panel      Y 1          Y 2      Y 3           Y 4___    Y 5  ___  
Intercept           48.76**     48.81**   51.60**   43.99**   48.19**    48.48**  50.08** 
               (46.63)      (49.92)     (28.45)    (39.36)     (44.90)     (48.96)    (49.11) 
 
Party (P)            7.34**      7.24**    -2.10         3.50      6.69**     10.67**  13.37** 
   (+)             (3.39)     (3.05)     (-0.59)      (1.32)     (2.63)        (4.00)  (4.95) 
 
Duration*P           -1.66*     -1.71*       0.11       -1.39*     -1.74*       -2.24**   -2.46** 
   (-)            (-1.84)    (-2.03)      (0.11)     (-1.78)    (-1.85)      (-2.48)      (-2.30) 
 
DowJones*P/100     11.53*      8.72*      -8.19         3.00       6.98        16.34**   15.95** 
   (+)              (2.44)     (1.84)    (-0.75)       (0.53)     (1.22)        (3.32)  (2.52) 
 
Growth*P             0.50**      0.73**     2.00**     1.40**     0.91**      0.18  -0.18 
   (+)              (2.83)     (4.66)     (7.69)        (9.11)     (5.45)       (0.95)     (-0.81) 
 
Inflation*P            -0.73*     -0.66*       0.81        -0.09     -0.53*      -1.17**    -1.69** 
   (-)             (-2.46)    (-2.17)      (1.29)     (-0.24)     (-1.60)      (-3.38)     (-4.34) 
 
Army*P/100             3.88*      0.14       -7.39         -4.28     -1.05         3.32*  9.25** 
   (+)              (2.26)       (0.09)     (-1.91)      (-2.08)   (-0.53)       (1.85)      (4.04) 
 
ArmySpend*P/100   -8.10**    -6.94*       8.15         -2.31     -6.73*    -11.05**   -17.30** 
   (-)             (-2.78)   (-2.25)      (1.96)      (-0.73)     (-2.05)     (-3.19)      (-4.58) 
 
Adjusted R-squared   0.75    0.55        0.54  0.61      0.58         0.64   0.65 
SE of Regression       3.54    9.59      11.81           9.46      8.49         6.18   6.34 
Number Observ.    23   1126         228   230       219          230    219 
 
Pred. Vote 2008       49.98       50.14       44.60        44.66    50.40       51.09  53.35 
(Conf. Interval)      (±3.95)     (±1.58)    (±4.47)     (±3.87)    (±3.84)    (±2.50)      (±3.04) 
Y Group Weight                     0.147        0.090    0.220       0.219  0.323 
 
**Significant at one percent level, and *significant at five percent level, one-tail tests.  
Dependent variable is the Democratic share of the two-party vote.  Aggregate estimate is 
based on total US Democratic share; Panel estimate is based on state-by-state shares; and Y1 
through Y5 panel estimates are state quartile groupings ordered by per capita real GDP, where 
Y1 is the lowest ten income states, Y2 is the next higher ten income states, etc.  See text for 
explanation of the regressors; expected signs are summarized below these variables. The 
aggregate equation is estimated with ordinary least squares, and robust (White) t-statistics are 
in parentheses.  All panel equations are estimated with generalized least squares based on 
cross-section weights, include cross-section fixed effects, and robust (White cross section) t-
statistics are in parentheses.   
  9                                   
                                   DATA APPENDIX FOR TABLE 1 
 
YEAR VOTE PARTY DURA-  DOW  GROWTH INFLA- ARMY ARMY- 
     TION  JONES   TION   SPEND 
1916 51.682  1  1  12  6.38  7.73  2.33  4.04 
1920 36.119  1  2  -23.5  -6.14  8.01  -107.6  11.24 
1924 41.756  -1  1  6.0  -2.16  0.62  -3.38  -23.05 
1928 41.240  -1  2  31.3  -0.63  0.81  -0.48  10.15 
1932 59.140  -1  3  -25  -13.98  10.01  -2.97  -37.56 
1936  62.458  1  1 24.9 13.41 1.36  7.6  28.86 
1940 54.999  1  2  -12.9  6.97  0.53  16.79  8.33 
1944 53.774  1  3  9.0  6.88  1.98  53.1  17.16 
1948 52.37  1  4  6.3  3.77  10.39  -38.82  -86.56 
1952 44.595  1  5  -1.8  -0.34  2.66  43.89  71.59 
1956 42.240  -1  1  2.4  -0.69  3.59  -9.93  -14.34 
1960 50.090  -1  2  -13.9  -1.92  2.16  -4.1  -8.44 
1964 61.344  1  1  15.8  2.38  1.73  -3.68  -5.88 
1968 49.596  1  2  10.0  4.0  3.94  0.06  6.28 
1972 38.21  -1  1  5.4  5.05  5.17 -11.91  -19.71 
1976 51.05  -1  2  3.0  0.78  7.64 -2.56 -20.15 
1980 44.697  1  1  12.4  -5.69  8.99  -1.37  -0.44 
1984 40.83  -1  1  -6.9  2.69  3.68 -0.22  7.38 
1988 46.07  -1  2  12.6  2.43  3.3  -1.58 -1.09 
1992 53.455  -1  3  -0.9  1.34  3.15  -7.33  -10.11 
1996 54.736  1  1  24.54  3.08  1.95  -5.62  -12.67 
2000 50.265  1  2  -5.02  2.95  1.8  -2  1.83 
2004 48.586    -1  1  -8.01  3.49  2.50  -0.51  14.91 
2008   -1  2 -30.7* 2.10* 3.70*  -0.87*  0.41* 
 
*Preliminary estimate, with computation date of September 17, 2008. 
 
Notes:  Above are aggregate data, and through 2000 are from Haynes and Stone (2004, p. 11), 
where the incumbent share of the two-party vote is changed to VOTE, the Democratic share 
of the two-party vote.  For 2004 and 2008 data, DOWJONES are from Dow Jones and Co.; 
GROWTH and INFLATION from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: Current-Dollar and 
Real Gross Domestic Product; ARMY from U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, Section 10, National Defense and Veterans Affairs; and ARMYSPEND from U.S. 
Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Section 9: Federal Government 
Finances and Employment. Disaggregate state-level data on VOTE, not presented in this 
appendix, are computed from popular vote data in U.S. Presidential Elections and U.S. 
National Archives and Records Administration. Per capita personal income by state for mid-
sample year 1960 are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional Economic Accounts. 
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